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Abstract The involvement of metacognition in mindful-
ness is already acknowledged in recent mindfulness
models. The focus of the current paper is on how mind-
fulness may be seen to involve a particular subcategory
of metacogni t ive fee l ing refer red to as f r inge
consciousness. Fringe feelings are in themselves con-
sciously experienced but have been demonstrated to re-
flect nonconscious context information and are assumed
to play a functional role in metacognitive monitoring and
behavioral control. I first address ways in which
metaexperiences during mindfulness may be seen as a
variety of fringe consciousness. I then turn to how mind-
fulness practice may change a person’s attitude to fringe
feelings, which in turn may influence the ease with
which currently unconscious cognitive content may be
retrieved. Finally, I specifically discuss how feelings of
novelty, described by many as characteristic of a mindful
state, may be understood within the fringe consciousness
framework. I propose that fringe consciousness may be a
useful framework for understanding the relationship be-
tween cognition and certain forms of subjective feelings
during mindfulness.
Keywords Mindfulness .Metacognition .Metacognitive
feelings . Experience-based feelings . Fringe consciousness .
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Introduction
Over the last years, there has been an increased interest in the
relationship between mindfulness and metacognition (e.g.,
Jankowski and Holas 2014; Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, and
Freedman 2006), which can broadly be defined as cognition
about one’s own cognition (Koriat 2007; Metcalfe 2000;
Dunlosky and Metcalfe 2009; Nelson 1990). The relevance of
metacognition to mindfulness can be illustrated by the fact that
heightened attention and an open orientation to one’s own men-
tal events, which are characteristic ofmindful states (e.g., Bishop
et al. 2004), both require that the person monitors and controls
aspects of their ongoing cognitive activity, which are the two
core functional mechanisms of metacognition (Nelson 1990).
Shapiro et al (2006) specifically linked mindfulness to
metacognition, arguing that the process of mindfully attending
with openness and nonjudgementalness leads to what is re-
ferred to as reperceiving. This involves a shift in perspective,
where thoughts, feelings, and sensations that were previously
Bsubject^ now become Bobject^ (Shapiro et al. 2006), in the
sense that they are experienced more independently of one’s
expectations, experience, or attitudes. This involves a more
flexible attitude to one’s experiences. The contrasting state
of mind would be mindlessness, during which the individual
is highly context-dependent, ignorant to novel aspects of their
environment, and overreliant on learned schemas and scripts
(Langer 1992).
In Jankowski and Holas’ (2014) Bmetacognitive model of
mindfulness,^ different levels of metacognition in mindful-
ness, as well as different subcomponents of metacognition
and the relationship between them, are specified and
discussed. In addition to the distinction between an object
level and a meta-level (Nelson 1990), suggested by Shapiro
et al. (2006) to be central to understanding mindfulness, they
suggest that metacognition during mindfulness can also take
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place at a meta-meta level. At the meta-level, metacognitive
thoughts or experiences relate to raw, first-level experience or
qualia—for example, Bmy breathing is shallow.^ At the meta-
meta-level, the object of metacognition is in itself
metacognitive, e.g., BI am just thinking of the qualities of
my breathing.^ The model represents a step toward a more
detailed understanding of the (meta)cognitive mechanisms in-
volved in mindfulness, and also a closer integration of differ-
ent traditions within mindfulness research and practice
(Brown and Ryan 2003; Kabat-Zinn 2003). Furthermore, the
model is compatible with recent attempts to draw parallels
between research on metacognition and metaemotion—i.e.,
emotions about emotions (Norman and Furnes 2016).
Interestingly, Jankowski and Holas (2014) suggested that
even though metacognitive experiences during mindfulness
are always conscious, they may sometimes result from mon-
itoring and judging processes that may be implicit and uncon-
scious. There are clear similarities between this form of
experience-based metacognitive feelings and fringe
consciousness. Even though Jankowski and Holas (2014)
briefly discussed fringe consciousness as a metacognitive phe-
nomenon, they did not specifically address how it may be
involved in mindfulness. This is the question I raise in this
paper. I propose three different forms the involvement of
fringe consciousness in mindfulness may take. In my view,
more knowledge about metacognitive experiences during
mindfulness, and how theymight relate to aspects of cognitive
processing, is important in order to obtain a better insight into
the mechanisms involved in mindfulness and its effects.
Fringe Consciousness as a Concept Relevant
to Mindfulness
Fringe consciousness was first described by James (1890). He
referred to the substantive, lingering, and articulate aspects of
consciousness as Bthe nucleus,^ and the transitive, fleeting,
and inarticulate aspects as Bthe fringe.^ Common examples
of fringe feelings are tip-of-the-tongue experiences, feelings of
rightness/wrongness, feelings of familiarity/novelty, and feel-
ings of knowing (Mangan 2001, 2014, 2015). What these phe-
nomena have in common is the presence of a subjectively
experienced feeling in the absence of current conscious aware-
ness of the information-processing antecedents of that feeling
(Mangan 2001; Norman 2002, 2010; Norman Price and Duff
2010). Fringe consciousness can be seen as a summary repre-
sentation of information that in itself is currently inaccessible
to consciousness, but nevertheless relevant to the current con-
tents of focal awareness (Mangan 2001). Importantly, the ab-
sence of such access is perceived as anomalous or surprising
because it occurs in a situation in which the person would
normally expect there to be conscious access to the informa-
tion in question (Price and Norman 2008). For instance,
because a feeling of familiarity occurring at the sight of a
person would in most cases be associated with conscious rec-
ollection of the person’s identity, the lack of such information
may be perceived as anomalous.
Fringe consciousness is sometimes described as vague.
One way of understanding vagueness is in terms of lack of
clarity of the subjective experience itself (Mangan 2001), or
the difficulties in verbalizing it (Price 2002). However, not all
fringe feelings are vague in this sense—for instance, a tip-of-
the-tongue experience may be both strong and vivid (Price
2002), and could also be introspected upon (Norman et al.
2010). However, fringe feelings could still be seen as vague
in the sense that they do not themselves contain the informa-
tion they represent (Galin 1994; Norman et al. 2010; Price
2002). Importantly, fringe consciousness is suggested to have
a retrieval function (Mangan 2001). This implies that attempts
to direct attention to fringe feelings, or hold attention on them,
may help the individual redirect attention to the information it
represents (Norman 2002).
Interestingly, Jankowski and Holas pointed to the possible
involvement of fringe conscious experience in mindfulness,
although not discussing the question in depth. First, they
pointed to the possibility that mindfulness practice may in-
crease a person’s sensitivity to Bvague, transient and elusive
meta-feelings^ like the tip-of-the-tongue experience
(Jankowski and Holas 2014, p. 70). Furthermore, they men-
tioned feelings of novelty as an example of feelings that occur
during mindfulness practice.
A Proposed Role of Fringe Consciousness
in Mindfulness
In order to more specifically address how fringe conscious-
ness may be involved in mindfulness, I propose three assump-
tions, namely that (1) metaexperiences during mindfulness
may have the quality of fringe consciousness, (2) mindfulness
practice may change the person’s attitude to fringe feelings,
and (3) feelings of novelty during mindfulness may be under-
stood as a variety of fringe consciousness.
Metaexperiences During Mindfulness May Have
the Quality of Fringe Consciousness
There are several reasons for assuming that metaexperiences
during mindfulness may have the quality of fringe
consciousness.
Fringe consciousness is a form of metacognitive expe-
rience that provides an Bovertone^ to, but is still separate
from, the contents of focal attention (Mangan 2014). For
example, it has been argued that aesthetic experiences are
characterized by feelings of rightness (Mangan 2015), but
where the person lacks full conscious access to what
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particular aspect of the stimulus situation gave rise to the
subjective feeling state. Through coloring the primary sen-
sory content, fringe feelings may also alter the experiential
quality of the primary sensory content to which they re-
late—just like it has been suggested that metacognition
during mindfulness may change the person’s first-order
experience (Jankowski and Holas 2014).
Second, both fringe consciousness and mindful states have
an elusive quality that renders them difficult to introspect up-
on. As pointed out by Block-Lerner, Salters-Pedneault, and
Tull (2005), because mindfulness and acceptance by their
very nature relate to the present moment, attempts to capture
these processes are limited. Similarly, fringe consciousness is
often described as elusive. For example, Baars (1988) referred
to the tip-of-the-tongue state as a Bfleeting conscious event^
(p. 68), and Mangan (1993) described fringe feelings as
Bslippery, elusive, ungraspable^ (p. 95). However, even
though both forms of experience are described as elusive, it
has been suggested that different fringe conscious experience
differ in terms of their degree of elusiveness. Whereas some
fringe feelings are short-lived and difficult to introspect upon,
others are more long-lasting and can be experienced more
strongly (Norman 2002). Similar assumptions could be made
about mindful states.
If metacognitive experiences during mindfulness some-
times take the form of fringe consciousness, this may also help
resolve the apparent tension between, on the one hand, the
assumption that mindfulness involves metacognitive experi-
ences (Jankowski and Holas 2014), and the claim that mind-
fulness is characterized by so-called phenomenological
reduction (Brown and Cordon 2009). According to Brown
and Cordon, the experiential quality of mindfulness is similar
to the Husserlian concept second mode of processing. This is
in contrast to a natural attitude in which sensory input is
embedded in the automatically occurring evaluations or judg-
ments about them, because B…not even a single, normal sen-
sory perception is supposed to correspond to things existing in
themselves^ (Husserl 2008 p. 150). This view of mindfulness
as involving unfiltered and receptive perception may seem at
odds with the metacognitive perspective of mindfulness. In
my opinion, fringe consciousness may provide a way of un-
derstanding how these two viewpoints may nevertheless be
compatible: if every focal content is associated with fringe
consciousness, then this would apply no less to mindful states
than to other psychological states. Possible differences be-
tween them may instead relate to the extent to which the per-
son pays attention to fringe consciousness, or the quality of
fringe consciousness during mindful versus nonmindful
states.
Based on the above arguments, I would hypothesize that
mindfulness may be characterized by fringe consciousness. If
mindful experience sometimes has the quality of fringe con-
sciousness, this could also imply that mindfulness training
may increase the frequency with which fringe consciousness
is experienced during mindfulness, and could also have an
impact on the frequency and quality of fringe experiences in
other situations. It could also be hypothesized that the
frequency with which one experiences mindful states in
general, and fringe conscious states in particular, is
influenced by certain individual difference variables. One
candidate is openness to experience, which has already
shown to be related to both mindfulness and fringe
consciousness. Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, and
Toney (2006) reported a positive relationship between scores
on the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale and Bopenness to
experience.^ Similarly, Norman, Price, and Duff (2006) found
that individuals who scored higher on the NEO-PI Openness
subscale Bopenness to feelings^ showed more learning and
more fringe awareness of acquired knowledge in an implicit
learning task. Future studies may want to look at how person-
ality variables like thismay predict the frequency and intensity
of fringe feelings during mindfulness.
Mindfulness Practice May Change the Person’s Attitude
to Fringe Feelings
Brown and Cordon (2009) are among those who have sug-
gested that mindfulness may lead to a higher sensitivity to
psychological or somatic signals, which in turn make the per-
son more in control of these signals. This is also compatible
with studies showing that mindfulness is related to increased
levels of interoceptive awareness (e.g., Farb, Segal, and
Anderson 2012). For example, it has been found that the in-
trospective accuracy of experienced meditation practitioners,
assessed in terms of tactile sensitivity for different body re-
gions during a Bbody-scanning^ meditation, was significantly
higher than that of novices (Fox, Zakarauskas, Dixon, Ellamil,
Thompson, and Christoff 2012). A plausible hypothesis, that
is also compatible with claims made by Jankowski and Holas
(2014), is that mindfulness training may also increase the per-
son’s sensitivity to subtle, fringe feelings.
In mindfulness meditation, the goal of becoming able to
Bact without acting^ (Jankowski and Holas 2014, p. 69) would
in itself imply that the person has introspective access to his/
her ongoing experience, keeps a decentered attitude toward
this experience, and accepts whichever experiences may arise.
This is clearly compatible with the view that sensitivity to
fringe consciousness would be associated with a higher degree
of conscious control over one’s feelings (Norman et al. 2006).
However, it may seem at odds with fringe conscious experi-
ences being described as vague in the sense of fringe feelings
being perceived as lacking the information they represent
(Norman et al. 2010; Price 2002). According to Price and
Norman (2008), the felt gap between the purpose of a fringe
feeling and the absence of the information that the feeling
signals, would be perceived as anomalous or unexpected.
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For example, one may expect feelings of knowing occurring
in memory situations to be accompanied by the searched-for
knowledge, and feelings of familiarity for a person’s face to be
accompanied by immediate conscious recollection of their
identity (Norman et al. 2010). However, the mere idea of a
feeling being experienced as unexpected implies that there is
something one should expect from certain categories of feel-
ings, which seems incompatible with the nonjudgmental atti-
tude that is sometimes formulated as a goal in mindfulness
meditation. For instance, acceptance may imply letting go of
the struggle to control one’s experience (Block-Lerner et al.
2005). One hypothesis is therefore that the process of devel-
oping a more decentered attitude to one’s feelings also in-
volves vagueness being experienced somewhat differently.
For example, to a mindful person, a feeling of familiarity
may be less likely to be perceived as unexpected or anoma-
lous. Instead, the person may accept that certain feelings are
not accompanied by the information they point to. In other
words, to the extent that mindfulness practice may change a
person’s attitude to fringe feelings, one hypothesis is that this
change is related to the experience of vagueness.
A goal of mindfulness in psychotherapy may be to help the
person become aware of previously inaccessible knowledge.
According to Brown and Cordon (2009), B… a more sensitive
awareness can lead to the uncovering of (perhaps challenging)
psychological or somatic realities that can be given focused
attention as a means to investigate, more fully process, and
thereby better regulate and transcend them.^ (p. 65). The
question is then how a more decentered attitude, in which
feelings are less likely to be experienced as unexpected or
anomalous, would impact on the process of gaining access
to previously unconscious information. One possibility is that
a person with a decentered attitude to fringe feelings will be
less likely to attempt retrieving the sought-after information.
For example, even though the person has a strong feeling of
familiarity at the sight of someone, they may choose to not
consciously try to remember the person’s identity. The ques-
tion is then whether this would reduce or increase the likeli-
hood of gaining access to information that was previously
inaccessible. Based on what is known about passivity effects
in nonconscious perception (Price 2001), one may predict a
passive attitude to be beneficial under certain circumstances.
This is also compatible with Mangan’s (2001) claim that
fringe feelings are, by nature, impossible to Bfiguratively
grasp or squeeze^ (Sect. 3.7), and that attempts to attend to
themwill therefore never fully succeed. From this perspective,
a mindful attitude characterized by detachment may in fact
facilitate retrieval of relevant nonconscious information rather
than hinder it. However, the likelihood of gaining access to
previously unconscious information may also be indicated by
the relative salience of the feeling itself (Norman 2002). If
potential accessibility is high, as in the transition between
different thoughts in a line of thoughts, any fringe feelings
will have a fleeting quality because attempts to direct attention
to themwill bring another focal content into focus. In contrast,
when the information in question is highly inaccessible, as in
implicit learning or memory, the resulting feeling will have a
frozen quality and be possible to focally attend.
It should be added that even if mindful states may be char-
acterized by fringe feelings, and even if mindfulness would
increase people’s sensitivity to and awareness of them, I am
not arguing that all metacognitive experiences involved in
mindfulness would qualify as being fringe conscious, neither
am I attempting to specify the exact conditions under which
such feelings would occur—these questions would require
detailed empirical investigation. In addition, the possible ef-
fect of mindfulness on people’s attitude to fringe feelings may
of course not only be limited to fringe feelings during mind-
fulness, but also apply to fringe conscious experiences in other
contexts.
Mindfulness May Be Associated with Fringe Feelings
of Novelty
A particular form of metaexperience that according to
Jankowski and Holas (2014) is characteristic of mindfulness,
is the feeling of novelty, i.e., that the perception of situations
and objects that the person is already familiar with, neverthe-
less is experienced in a new and different way. It is also re-
ferred to as beginner’s mind (Bishop et al. 2004), or feelings of
discovery or surprise (Mason and Hargreaves 2001).
Jankowski and Holas (2014) explained feelings of nov-
elty within the framework of construal level theory (Trope
and Liberman 2010), according to which the felt psycho-
logical distance to an object or a person has implications
for the level of abstraction with which the object or person
is represented, with increased distance being associated
with more global representations. If a mindful attempt of
Bbeing here and now^ (Jankowski and Holas, p. 70) re-
duces psychological distance to objects in one’s imediate
environment, this may involve more local and detailed per-
ceptual processing. Jankowski and Holas further argued that
this type of processing reduces effects of expectation on
perception, which further increases the likelihood that stim-
uli and events are perceived as novel.
From a fringe consciousness perspective, one may make
some additional predictions concerning the nature of feelings
of novelty and the circumstances under which they occur dur-
ing mindfulness.
First, feelings of novelty could be seen as not only occur-
ring when there is a shift from global to local perceptual pro-
cessing, but also when stimuli in focal awareness activate
different associations than before, i.e., other nonconscious
knowledge representations. This could for example be the
result of new associations being learned during mindfulness
practice. As an illustration, in a qualitative study of
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mindfulness-based stress reduction, a patient with a history of
depression reported feelings of discovery/surprise, and an
opening of the mind (Mason and Hargreaves 2001) related
to the realization that Bwhat goes through your mind are just
mental phenomena, they are just thoughts, not necessarily
truths^ (p. 204). In cases like these, it may be hypothesized
that what gives rise to feelings of novelty (or discovery/sur-
prise) may be that stimuli previously associated with rumina-
tion and worry have become associated with, e.g., relaxation
and acceptance.
Second, feelings of novelty could be seen as signaling a
change in the overall quality of cognitive representations.
According to Winkielman, Ziembowicz, and Nowak (2015),
fringe consciousness may be seen as reflecting what they refer
to as "global processing experiences,^ i.e., the overall proper-
ties of knowledge representations at the neural level.
Interestingly, Winkielman and Nowak (2005) specifically re-
ferred to feelings of novelty as a fast feedback signal that in-
forms the person about how current contents of focal awareness
relates to knowledge representations. From this perspective,
feelings of novelty may even be regarded as the conscious
correlate of the characteristic patterns of cortical activation that
have been documented to result frommindfulness training (see,
e.g., Farb et al. 2007; Farb et al. 2012; Hölzel et al. 2011).
It should be noted that even though Bfeelings of novelty^
addressed inmindfulness research most often concern familiar
events or objects which are perceived in a different way than
before, feelings of novelty may also occur when the person
directs attention to parts of the environment that have been
encountered in the past, but previously not been attended to in
much detail. One example is the experience of the sensation
underneath one’s feet.
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